For most of the time since 1995, the Japanese price level has declined. Since early 1999, short-term interest rates have mostly remained near zero. Also, starting in 2001, the excess reserves held by banks have risen dramatically. Many observers have concluded that central banks are powerless to end deflation when short-term interest rates are near zero. This paper argues that such a pessimistic conclusion is unwarranted.
Since the early 1980s, a remarkable change has occurred in the political and popular consensus about central banks.
According to the new consensus, central banks should control inflation. They should do so without wage and price controls and various forms of moral suasion and government interference with private price setting. They should possess "instrument independence" to change the interest rate by whatever amount necessary to control inflation.
However, the recent deflationary experience of Japan has weakened the consensus about the extent of central bank control over deflation. Central banks can control inflation because there is no limit to how high they can raise their instrument, the interbank rate. But can they control deflation? Is there not a fundamental asymmetry that derives from the central bank's inability to push the interest rate below zero? This debate reveals a continuing lack of intellectual consensus over how central banks determine the behavior of the price level. Opinion splits over the fundamental issues of the nature of the price level and of the monetary transmission mechanism. First, is the price level a monetary phenomenon determined by the way that the central bank controls money creation? Alternatively, is it a nonmonetary phenomenon determined by a multiplicity of real factors that exercise their influence on the price level directly rather than indirectly through their effect on the money stock and real money demand? Second, does the central bank exercise its control over prices through money creation that forces portfolio rebalancing by the public? Alternatively, does it exercise its control through influence over financial intermediation?
In this paper, I argue against the view that Japanese deflation reveals an asymmetry in the ability of central banks to control inflation and deflation. This quantity theory view contrasts with the popular "liquidity" view that holds that the central bank is impotent to end deflation after it has lowered the interest rate to zero. 
I. The liquidity view
The liquidity view interprets monetary policy in terms of financial intermediation. Speculative activity, allowed to run unchecked, will lead to a collapse of asset prices. The difficulty of dealing with the resulting excessive debt and inventories leads to recession and deflation. Swings in asset prices and their amplifying or depressing effects on financial intermediation can overwhelm the ability of central banks to control the price level.
From this perspective, an explanation of Japanese monetary experience after 1990 begins with the collapse of the "bubble economy." In the last part of the 1980s, perhaps encouraged by an overly easy monetary policy, land and equity prices rose to unsustainable heights. The decline in asset prices with the "bursting of the bubble" limited the ability of banks to extend credit. The common practice of collateralizing loans with land led to the nonperforming loan problem. Banks were slow to recognize this problem because of the assumption that asset prices would recover and make troubled loans viable again.
The rise in nonperforming loans entailed two consequences for bank behavior. First, banks ceased reallocating capital from unproductive to productive sectors of the economy. As a result, productivity growth fell significantly. Failure by banks to foreclose on nonperforming loans prevented the restructuring of the economy that leads to growth.
Second, banks became risk-averse. Even though the central bank provided ample liquidity, banks were unwilling to extend credit to new enterprises. Instead, they invested in safe assets, especially JGBs. In February 1999 out of a concern for the stability of the banking system that followed the insolvencies of two large financial institutions in fall 1998, the BoJ instituted the Zero-Interest-Rate-Policy (ZIRP) of providing reserves at a near-zero call rate. Despite this availability of funding, bank lending continued to decline. The breakdown in the monetary transmission mechanism means that the BoJ is helpless to offset deflationary pressures through traditional means. Given the failure of banks to expand lending despite ample reserves provision, the BoJ must pursue unconventional measures to revive financial intermediation. An example of such a measure is the decision made in fall 2002 to buy stocks from banks. The idea is that with fewer risky assets, banks will become willing to resume commercial lending.
II. The quantity theory
The dispute between the quantity theory and the liquidity view over whether the price level is a monetary phenomenon reflects disagreement over the direction of influence running between central bank money creation and prices. One often hears the expression, "When the central bank uses an interest rate instrument, money is demand determined." To understand the relationship between money and prices, it is necessary to clarify the ambiguities in this observation.
According to the liquidity view, as a consequence of its interest rate target, the central bank simply provides whatever money the public demands at a price level determined by nonmonetary forces. The quantity theory offers a more subtle explanation. To begin, the interest rate possesses two components--a real rate and an expectation of inflation (or deflation). If the price level is a monetary phenomenon, each of these components imposes a discipline on the way that the central bank sets its interest rate peg.
The real rate of interest functions as part of the price system to reconcile individuals to an unequal intertemporal distribution of consumption. A benchmark for the real rate is the natural rate-the real rate of interest consistent with growth at the economy's potential. Money creation (destruction) allows the central bank to create a temporary divergence between the real rate and the natural rate. Such money creation forces the public into portfolio rebalancing.
The monetary acceleration at the end of the 1980s and the subsequent monetary deceleration indicate a short-term interest rate that was, respectively, too low and too high. Banks engage in the longer-term repurchase operations to arbitrage the small differences in the prices at which they buy from the market and sell to the BoJ. At a 3 or 4 month maturity, the price of a bill is low enough (the interest rate high enough) that the bank can purchase it in the market and resell it to the BoJ at a slightly higher price (lower interest rate). In its fund provision operations, the Desk can choose an interest rate low enough to attract sufficient bids to provide whatever amount of reserves it desires. At the same time, it regulates reserves absorption by controlling sales of Treasury and finance bills.
These combined operations along with outright purchases of assets like JGBs allow the Desk to create the amount of base money required to meet the Policy Board's CAB target.
Unfortunately, these procedures offer no information on the issue of whether purposeful injections of reserves would entail a reserves-money multiplier effect. The policymaker needs to know whether the demand for CABs is inelastic or highly elastic at a near-zero call rate. However, the motivation of the individual banks that engage in open market operations offers no information about the nature of CAB demand. The individual banks that offer the bills to the BoJ Desk in the latter's 3 to 4 month reserves provision operations do so to arbitrage the difference in interest rates at which they buy and sell the bill.
Furthermore, the individual banks that buy the bills from the Desk in the reserves absorption operations do so in exchange for an asset that often pays only .001 percent interest. In this transaction, the two assets, CABs and short-term bills, are almost perfect substitutes. From such exchanges, one does not learn whether the total of CABs and short-term liquid assets is well defined. The BoJ cannot learn from these exchanges whether it can spur asset acquisition by banks by altering the ratio of illiquid assets to the total of liquid assets (CABs plus shortterm securities) held by banks.
B. The BoJ strategy for monetary base provision
The high level of CABs prompts statements like "orthodox monetary policy has failed." Such statements assume that the BoJ's open market purchases conform to the textbook example of purchases made independently of the demand by banks for reserves.
The implicit assumption is that the high level of CABs implies a reserves-money multiplier equal to one and, consequently, the need for large reserves injections to spur money growth. 7 However, the procedures the BoJ's Policy Board uses to determine the level of CABs do not provide the kind of "experiment" necessary to make such an assertion.
The reason is that the procedure the Policy Board uses to set its CAB target makes CABs demand determined. In particular, the Board has raised its CAB target as necessary to maintain the short end of the yield curve flat. The "quantitative" policy adopted in March 2001 retains a fundamental continuity with the earlier policy adopted in fall 1997. [T]he Bank had been able to increase the outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank...because (1) there had been concerns about the stability of the financial system since autumn 2001; (2) liquidity demand surged in preparation for funding beyond the calendar and fiscal year-end; and (3) the intermediary functions of the money market declined due to the extremely low interest rates. Although the money demand function exhibits considerable stability, money demand varies with a number of variables. For this reason, stable money growth is not necessarily desirable.
Because real money demand depends upon interest rates (the own rate on M2 minus the market rate), wealth, and real output, the relationship between money growth and inflation holds only over long periods of time. However, inflation is a monetary phenomenon and ultimately higher money growth, initiated independently of the variables that influence money demand, must lead to higher inflation. A revival of money growth will provide the first indication that stimulative monetary policy is inducing a change in bank behavior.
The estimated money demand function in Table 1 ( In the long run, money growth consistent with price stability must accommodate the secular increase in real money demand due to factors like wealth and the increased value of individuals' time. Figure 8 shows the steady increase in the ratio of money to nominal output. Money growth consistent with price stability will equal the approximate two percent trend growth shown in Figure 8 plus the trend growth in real output.
To achieve price stability, the BoJ must also make nominal output grow in line with trend real output. A major issue is the trend growth rate of potential output, which depends especially upon productivity growth. Hayashi and Prescott (2002, Such substitution raises the capital-labor ratio and validates a higher real wage but may be inefficient. Total hours worked has trended down from the beginning of 1998 (from 2.65 to less that 2.55 billion hours). Since 1998, the average of scheduled hours worked has fallen 10 percent and the labor force participation rate has fallen about 2.5 percentage points.
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During this period, the ratio of private fixed nonresidential investment to GDP has remained steady at about 15 percent (the value that preceded the rise in the mid-1980s). Furthermore, since the beginning of 1998, employment of regular workers has fallen at about an annualized rate of one percent while employment of part-time workers has grown in excess of 3 percent.
The substitution of part-time for full-time workers lowers the average wage rate, but may lower productivity by replacing experienced with inexperienced workers (Figure 11 ). Volcker changed operating procedures to emphasize the Fed's control over money creation (Hetzel 1982) . He made the foundation of monetary policy the control of inflationary expectations. Credibility came only slowly. However, Volcker made clear that he would raise the funds rate to whatever level was necessary to establish Fed credibility. In 1981, the funds rate rose to 21 percent. No one knew whether financial markets could withstand the strain. In 1982, the economy entered into its worst post-war recession. Unemployment rose to 9 percent.
In 1983, inflation fell from 12 percent to 4 percent. The
Volcker disinflation exercised a profound influence on the political and intellectual environment. Prior to this episode, the consensus held that maintenance of price stability required a socially unacceptable level of unemployment. When the Fed brought the inflation rate down and kept it down with only a moderate unemployment rate, the consensus changed. Governments became willing to assign responsibility for price stability to central banks and to give them the independence necessary to achieve it.
Japan's situation is now similar in many ways to that of the United States in 1979. Japan has experienced deflation for a significant period. Changing expectations will be difficult.
However, to lay a solid basis for monetary policy, the BoJ must change those expectations to conform to its objective of price stability. Volcker established credibility by making clear that the Fed would raise the funds rate to whatever level was necessary to restrain money growth and lower the public's expectation of inflation. The BoJ could make clear that it is ready to expand its portfolio of illiquid assets to increase the monetary base by whatever amount is necessary to revive money growth, restore the expectation of price stability, and maintain price stability. 
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The regression is in error-correction form. Observations are annual averages, except for wealth, which is a year-end observation. M is M2 plus CDs divided by the personal consumption expenditures price deflator; R is a rival interest rate paid on nonmonetary assets; RM is a weighted-average of the own rates of return paid on the components of M2; W is real wealth. E is the estimated residual from a money demand regression in level form using as independent variables GDP, (R-RM) and W. ln is the natural logarithm; ? is the firstdifference operator. CRSQ is the corrected R squared; SEE standard error of estimate; DW Durbin-Watson; and DF degrees of freedom. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
The dates for the regression are determined by the availability of data on the components of M2. Wealth data are available with a one-year lag. The Cabinet Office (CO) puts together wealth and national income and product account (SNA) data.
From 1957 through 1965, the rival rate ( R ) is the interest rate on discounts of government securities by banks with the BoJ (boj.or.jp/en/siryo/siryo_f.htm). Thereafter, it is a modification of the series used by Sekine (1998) . It is the highest interest rate from among the following instruments: 3-month (Gensaki) RPs, 5-year loan trusts, 5-year bank debentures (subscription and secondary market), and 5-year postal saving. The bank debenture series is included only through 1975. Before the beginning of deregulation in the early 1970s, it is the only available series that fluctuates. In the early 1970s, the RP rate fluctuates, but less than the bank debenture rate. However, the large inflow of funds due to speculation on yen revaluation may have biased downward the RP rate. The own rate on money ( RM ) is a weighted average of the own rates on the components of money (demand deposits, time deposits, savings deposits, and CDs). Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) argue that with a zero shortterm interest rate the BoJ can pursue a more stimulative monetary policy by committing to hold short-term rates at zero for a longer period. However, their model assumes complete credibility. Steady-state inflation is automatically equal to the central bank's inflation target. 12 The fall in the price of capital goods in general and IT goods in particular causes the GDP deflator to grow at a slower rate than consumer price indices. Private capital investment is about 15 percent of GDP. The deflator for private capital investment has fallen at an annual rate of about 4 percent from 2002Q3 through 2003Q3 (Matsuoka, 11/14/03) .
Forecasts of CPI inflation imply a lower real rate of interest. Consensus Economics publishes consensus forecasts for Japan from about 20 banks and securities firms. In December 2001 December , 2002 December and 2003 , it reported forecasts for CPI inflation over the following calendar year of -.9, -.7 and -.3 percent, respectively. The consumer price index (a Laspeyres index) has fallen less than the private consumption deflator (a Paasche index), which in turn has fallen less than the GDP deflator. 13 To avoid issues of credit allocation, the BoJ would have the shares in individual companies voted in trust by the mutual fund. If the BoJ purchased shares from a number of such funds, no individual fund would have significant voting power for an individual company. 14 The BoJ would have to change from lagged reserves accounting for calculating required reserves to contemporaneous reserves accounting. For the banking system to adjust reserves demand to a given amount of reserves supplied by the BoJ, a decline (increase) in the deposits of banks produced by asset sales (purchases) must lead to a decline (increase) in reserves demand. That can only happen with contemporaneous as opposed to lagged reserves accounting. 15 To change private behavior, the BoJ must engage in open market operations that change the proportion of liquid to illiquid assets in the public's portfolio. The alternative is to create money without an asset exchange with the public. (There is then a wealth effect as well as a portfolio rebalancing or substitution effect from money creation.) The BoJ could set a target for CABs and credit the deposit account the government holds with it by whatever amount is necessary to achieve the target. CABs would increase when the government drew down its account to purchase goods and services. The government could also use its deposits to finance transfer payments to the public, but could not use them to retire short-term debt.
Even if the BoJ exercised complete control over its credits to the government's deposit account, such a means of increasing the monetary base would raise questions about central bank independence. With the "benefits" of seigniorage so apparent, the government might be tempted to ask for legislation requiring a positive inflation target. 16 For example, because of the volatility of expectations, the BoJ will have trouble predicting how higher nominal output growth arising from monetary stimulus will break down in the short run into higher real output growth and lessening deflation (rising inflation -3  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02 Table 1 . Actual values are M2+CDs divided by the PCE deflator. 13  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03 
